Regulierung internationaler Finanzmärkte und Banken

Diese Forschungsgruppe analysiert Ursachen und Konsequenzen von internationalen Aktivitäten von Banken sowie den regulatorischen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen globale Banken operieren.

International aktive Banken können eine effiziente internationale Kapitalallokation vereinfachen und zur internationalen Risikoteilung beitragen. Allerdings können sie auch Instabilitäten generieren und zu einer Übertragung von Schocks über nationale Grenzen hinaus beitragen. Dies ist einer der Gründe für die aktuelle Re-Regulierung des internationalen Bankensystems.

Die Forschungsgruppe trägt auf drei verschiedenen Wegen zur Literatur bei. Erstens analysiert die Gruppe empirisch, warum internationale Banken global aktiv sind und wie Schocks im Finanzsystem übertragen werden. Zweitens untersucht die Gruppe das Entstehen von systemischen Risiken und Ungleichgewichten im integrierten Bankenmarkt und die sich daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen für die Realwirtschaft. Drittens werden die Auswirkungen von Änderungen bezüglich der Bankenaufsicht und Bankenregulierung analysiert, mit einem besonderen Fokus auf dem europäischen Integrationsprozess

 

IWH-Datenprojekt: International Banking Library

Forschungscluster
Finanzstabilität und Regulierung

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessorin Dr. Lena Tonzer
Juniorprofessorin Dr. Lena Tonzer
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
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PROJEKTE

07.2017 ‐ 12.2022

Die politische Ökonomie der europäischen Bankenunion

Europäischer Sozialfonds (ESF)

Ursachen für nationale Unterschiede in der Umsetzung der Bankenunion und daraus resultierende Auswirkungen auf die Finanzstabilität.

Projektseite ansehen

Juniorprofessorin Dr. Lena Tonzer

01.2015 ‐ 12.2017

Dynamic Interactions between Banks and the Real Economy

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)

Professor Dr. Felix Noth

Referierte Publikationen

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Political Influence and Financial Flexibility: Evidence from China

Xian Gu Iftekhar Hasan Yun Zhu

in: Journal of Banking and Finance, February 2019

Abstract

This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.

Publikation lesen

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Banks Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment

Reint E. Gropp Thomas Mosk Steven Ongena Carlo Wix

in: Review of Financial Studies, Nr. 1, 2019

Abstract

We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks’ balance sheets and their transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise is an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment to identify this impact with a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios by reducing their risk-weighted assets, not by raising their levels of equity, consistent with debt overhang. Banks reduce lending to corporate and retail customers, resulting in lower asset, investment, and sales growth for firms obtaining a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.

Publikation lesen

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Big Fish in Small Banking Ponds? Cost Advantages and Foreign Affiliate Presences

Michael Koetter Rients Galema

in: Journal of International Money and Finance, 2018

Abstract

We distinguish cost advantage at home from cost advantage vis-à-vis incumbent banks in destination markets to explain the probability of foreign bank affiliate lending. We combine detailed affiliate lending data of all German banks with public bank micro data from 59 destination markets. The likelihood to operate foreign affiliates depends positively on both types of cost advantage. Only cost advantage at home is economically significant. Generally, risk, return, and unobservable bank traits explain a larger share of the variation in foreign affiliate operations. Less profitable, more risky, and larger banks are more likely to operate affiliates abroad.

Publikation lesen

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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-selection and Competition

Reint E. Gropp Andre Guettler

in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Nr. 2, 2018

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a valuable signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the soft information from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect.

Publikation lesen

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International Banking and Cross-border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany

Jana Ohls Markus Pramor Lena Tonzer

in: International Journal of Central Banking, Supplement 1, March 2017

Abstract

We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments. These spillovers are, however, quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, domestic affiliates of foreign-owned global banks reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements, and loan-to-value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements is effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.

Publikation lesen

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