Professor Reint E. Gropp, Ph.D.

Professor Reint E. Gropp, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 11/14

Präsident

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 10/14

Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre


Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Finanzökonomik
  • Makroökonomik
  • Unternehmensfinanzierung
  • Geld und Banken

Reint E. Gropp ist seit 2014 Präsident des IWH und Inhaber eines Lehrstuhls für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg. Er ist Associate Fellow des Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) und Berater verschiedener Zentralbanken. 2021 wurde er zum Sprecher der Sektion-B-Institute der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft gewählt.

Reint E. Gropp hat Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Freiburg und der University of Wisconsin, Madison, studiert. Im Jahr 1994 schloss er dort seine Promotion in Economics ab. Vor seinem Amtsantritt am IWH war er Professor an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main und hatte dort die Stiftungsprofessur für Sustainable Banking and Finance inne. Zuvor war er in verschiedenen Positionen für den Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) sowie für die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) tätig, zuletzt als Deputy Head der Financial Research Division.

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Professor Reint E. Gropp, Ph.D.
Professor Reint E. Gropp, Ph.D.
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Publikationen

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Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Reint E. Gropp Thomas Mosk Steven Ongena Ines Simac Carlo Wix

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

Publikation lesen

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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises

Reint E. Gropp Steven Ongena Jörg Rocholl Vahid Saadi

in: Economic Inquiry, Nr. 3, 2022

Abstract

We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.

Publikation lesen

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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency

Reint E. Gropp Andre Guettler Vahid Saadi

in: Journal of Monetary Economics, December 2020

Abstract

A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.

Publikation lesen

Arbeitspapiere

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Flight from Safety: How a Change to the Deposit Insurance Limit Affects Households‘ Portfolio Allocation

H. Evren Damar Reint E. Gropp Adi Mordel

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 19, 2019

Abstract

We study how an increase to the deposit insurance limit affects households‘ portfolio allocation by exogenously reducing uninsured deposit balances. Using unique data that identifies insured versus uninsured deposits, along with detailed information on Canadian households‘ portfolio holdings, we show that households respond by drawing down deposits and shifting towards mutual funds and stocks. These outflows amount to 2.8% of outstanding bank deposits. The empirical evidence, consistent with a standard portfolio choice model that is modified to accommodate uninsured deposits, indicates that more generous deposit insurance coverage results in nontrivial adjustments to household portfolios.

Publikation lesen

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What Drives Banks‘ Geographic Expansion? The Role of Locally Non-diversifiable Risk

Reint E. Gropp Felix Noth Ulrich Schüwer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 6, 2019

Abstract

We show that banks that are facing relatively high locally non-diversifiable risks in their home region expand more across states than banks that do not face such risks following branching deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s. These banks with high locally non-diversifiable risks also benefit relatively more from deregulation in terms of higher bank stability. Further, these banks expand more into counties where risks are relatively high and positively correlated with risks in their home region, suggesting that they do not only diversify but also build on their expertise in local risks when they expand into new regions.

Publikation lesen

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Suppliers as Liquidity Insurers

Reint E. Gropp Daniel Corsten Panos Markou

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 8, 2017

Abstract

We examine how financial constraints in portfolios of suppliers affect cash holdings at the level of the customer. Utilizing a data set of private and public French companies and their suppliers, we show that customers rely on their financially unconstrained suppliers to provide them with backup liquidity, and that they stockpile approximately 10% less cash than customers with constrained suppliers. This effect persisted during the global financial crisis, highlighting that suppliers may be viable insurers of liquidity even when financing from banks and other external channels is unavailable. We further show that customers with unconstrained suppliers also simultaneously receive more trade credit; that the reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with stronger ties to their unconstrained suppliers; and that customers reduce their cash holdings following a significant relaxation in their suppliers’ financial constraints through an IPO. Taken together, the results provide important nuance regarding the implications of supplier portfolios and financial constraints on firm liquidity management.

Publikation lesen
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