Juniorprofessor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.

Juniorprofessor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/19

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Matching und Anreize in Finanzmärkten

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 4/19

Juniorprofessor für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Financial Economics

Universität Leipzig

seit 9/18

Mitglied der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Unternehmensführung
  • Unternehmensfinanzierung

Shuo Xia ist seit April 2019 Juniorprofessor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Leipzig. Seit September 2018 ist er Mitglied der Abteilung Finanzmärkte. Er forscht zu Themen der Unternehmensfinanzierung und Unternehmensführung.

Shuo Xia studierte an der Beijing University of Technology, University of Essex und an der VU Amsterdam. Er promovierte an der Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Juniorprofessor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-875 Persönliche Seite

Publikationen

Arbeitspapiere

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Trading away Incentives

Stefano Colonnello Giuliano Curatola Shuo Xia

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 23, 2022

Abstract

Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.

Publikation lesen

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Corporate Governance Benefits of Mutual Fund Cooperation

Rex Wang Renji Patrick Verwijmeren Shuo Xia

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 21, 2022

Abstract

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decision-making. We present evidence that dual ownership allows financially distressed firms to increase investments and to refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants. As such, dual ownership reduces shareholder-creditor conflicts, especially when families encourage cooperation among their managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the shareholder-creditor agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

Publikation lesen

Lame-Duck CEOs

Marc Gabarro Sebastian Gryglewicz Shuo Xia

in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018

Abstract

We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.

Publikation lesen
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