Dr. Carola Müller

Dr. Carola Müller
Aktuelle Position

seit 6/19

Research Affiliate

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 8/18

PhD-Trainee

Europäische Zentralbank

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Bankenregulierung
  • Finanzintermediation
  • Bankenwettbewerb

Carola Müller ist seit Juni 2019 Research Affiliate am IWH. Sie forscht zu Themen der Bankenregulierung und Bankenwettbewerb.

Carola Müller ist seit August 2018 PhD-Trainee in der Stress Test Modelling Division bei der Europäischen Zentralbank. Zuvor war sie Doktorandin am IWH und Gastforscherin bei der Deutschen Bundesbank. Sie studierte an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen.

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Dr. Carola Müller
Dr. Carola Müller
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Publikationen

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Market Power and Risk: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Market

Carola Müller Felix Noth

in: Economics Letters, 2018

Abstract

We use mortgage loan application data of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to shed light on the role of banks’ market power on their presumably insufficient risk screening activities in the U.S. mortgage market in the pre-crisis era. We find that banks with higher market power protect their charter value. The effect is stronger for banks that have more information about local markets.

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Arbeitspapiere

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May the Force Be with You: Exit Barriers, Governance Shocks, and Profitability Sclerosis in Banking

Michael Koetter Carola Müller Felix Noth Benedikt Fritz

in: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, Nr. 49, 2018

Abstract

We test whether limited market discipline imposes exit barriers and poor profitability in banking. We exploit an exogenous shock to the governance of government-owned banks: the unification of counties. County mergers lead to enforced government-owned bank mergers. We compare forced to voluntary bank exits and show that the former cause better bank profitability and efficiency at the expense of riskier financial profiles. Regarding real effects, firms exposed to forced bank mergers borrow more at lower cost, increase investment, and exhibit higher employment. Thus, reduced exit frictions in banking seem to unleash the economic potential of both banks and firms.

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Basel III Capital Requirements and Heterogeneous Banks

Carola Müller

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 14, 2018

Abstract

I develop a theoretical model to investigate the effect of simultaneous regulation with a leverage ratio and a risk-weighted ratio on banks‘ risk taking and banking market structure. I extend a portfolio choice model by adding heterogeneity in productivity among banks. Regulators face a trade-off between the efficient allocation of resources and financial stability. In an oligopolistic market, risk-weighted requirements incentivise banks with high productivity to lend to low-risk firms. When a leverage ratio is introduced, these banks lose market shares to less productive competitors and react with risk-shifting into high-risk loans. While average productivity in the low-risk market falls, market shares in the high-risk market are dispersed across new entrants with high as well as low productivity.

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