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Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz

Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz
Aktuelle Position

seit 4/21

Senior Research Advisor der Abteilungen Finanzmärkte und Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 4/21

Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Finanzintermediation
  • Unternehmensfinanzierung
  • Geldpolitik

Daniel Streitz ist seit April 2021 Senior Research Advisor am IWH und Professor an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena. Zu den Schwerpunkten seiner Forschung gehören die Finanzintermediation und die Unternehmensfinanzierung.

Daniel Streitz studierte an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster und promovierte an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Bevor er zum IWH kam, war er Assistenzprofessor an der Copenhagen Business School.

Ihr Kontakt

Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz
Professor Dr. Daniel Streitz
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-735 Persönliche Seite

Publikationen

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Spillover Effects in Empirical Corporate Finance

Tobias Berg Markus Reisinger Daniel Streitz

in: Journal of Financial Economics, Nr. 3, 2021

Abstract

Despite their importance, the discussion of spillover effects in empirical research often misses the rigor dedicated to endogeneity concerns. We analyze a broad set of workhorse models of firm interactions and show that spillovers naturally arise in many corporate finance settings. This has important implications for the estimation of treatment effects: i) even with random treatment, spillovers lead to a complicated bias, ii) fixed effects can exacerbate the spillover-induced bias. We propose simple diagnostic tools for empirical researchers and illustrate our guidance in an application.

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Bank Concentration and Product Market Competition

Farzad Saidi Daniel Streitz

in: Review of Financial Studies, Nr. 10, 2021

Abstract

This paper documents a link between bank concentration and markups in nonfinancial sectors. We exploit concentration-increasing bank mergers and variation in banks’ market shares across industries and show that higher credit concentration is associated with higher markups and that high-market-share lenders charge lower loan rates. We argue that this is due to the greater incidence of competing firms sharing common lenders that induce less aggressive product market behavior among their borrowers, thereby internalizing potential adverse effects of higher rates. Consistent with our conjecture, the effect is stronger in industries with competition in strategic substitutes where negative product market externalities are greatest.

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Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans

Tim R. Adam Valentin Burg Tobias Scheinert Daniel Streitz

in: Management Science, Nr. 1, 2020

Abstract

We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (performance-sensitive debt [PSD]). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue rate-increasing PSD than regular debt. They choose PSD with steeper performance-pricing schedules than those chosen by rational managers. We reject the possibility that overconfident managers have (persistent) positive private information and use PSD for signaling. Finally, firms seem to benefit less from using PSD ex post if they are managed by overconfident rather than rational managers.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Capital Misallocation and Innovation

Christian Schmidt Yannik Schneider Sascha Steffen Daniel Streitz

in: SSRN Solutions Research Paper Series, 2020

Abstract

This paper documents that "zombie" lending by undercapitalized banks distorts competition and impedes corporate innovation. This misallocation of capital prevents both the exit of zombie and entry of healthy firms in affected industries adversely impacting output and competition. Worse, capital misallocation depresses patent applications, particularly in high technology- and R&D-intensive sectors, and industries with neck- and-neck competition. We strengthen our results using an IV approach to address reverse causality and innovation survey data from the European Commission. Overall, our results are consistent with externalities imposed on healthy firms through the misallocation of capital.

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Schlagworte

Regulierung Finanzinstitutionen Unternehmensfinanzierung Evaluierung von Politikmaßnahmen Finanzmärkte Ökonometrie
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