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Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 10/20

Stellvertretender Präsident

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/16

Leiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/16

Professor für Financial Economics

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg

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Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Allokation von Unternehmensinvestition und Gesamtwachstum
  • Finanzintermediation
  • Finanzmarktstabilität und Bankenregulierung
  • Risikobereitschaft und Wettbewerb
  • reale Auswirkungen auf Geldpolitik und Wirtschaftspolitik

Michael Koetter ist stellvertretender Präsident des Instituts und Leiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte am IWH. Er ist Professor für Financial Economics an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg. Die Abteilung richtet die jährliche FIN-FIRE conference on challenges to financial stability aus. Seine Forschung untersucht vornehmlich mithilfe empirischer Methoden die Interaktionen zwischen Finanzinstitutionen und -systemen, Regulation, Politik und der Realwirtschaft.

Michael Koetter promovierte an der Universität Utrecht und studierte International Money and Banking an der Universität Maastricht. Er war Professor an der Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (2012 – 2016) und an der Universität Groningen (2006 – 2012). Zurzeit ist er Mitglied des wissenschaftlichen Beratungsausschusses des Forschungsdaten- und Servicezentrums der Deutschen Bundesbank, Editor bei der Fachzeitschrift Economics of Transition and Institutional Change (ETIC) sowie Associate Editor beim Journal of Financial Stability. Er fungierte regelmäßig als Berater bei Zentralbanken und war Präsident der IBEFA.

Ihr Kontakt

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Leiter - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-727 Persönliche Seite

Publikationen

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Political Cycles in Bank Lending to the Government

Michael Koetter Alexander Popov

in: Review of Financial Studies, Nr. 6, 2021

Abstract

We study how political party turnover after German state elections affects banks’ lending to the regional government. We find that between 1992 and 2018, party turnover at the state level leads to a sharp and substantial increase in lending by local savings banks to their home-state government. This effect is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in private lending. A statistical association between political party turnover and government lending is absent for comparable cooperative banks that exhibit a similar regional organization and business model. Our results suggest that political frictions may interfere with government-owned banks’ local development objectives.

Publikation lesen
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Equity Crowdfunding: High-quality or Low-quality Entrepreneurs?

Daniel Blaseg Douglas Cumming Michael Koetter

in: Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, Nr. 3, 2021

Abstract

Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.

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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Moritz Stieglitz

in: Economic Inquiry, Nr. 1, 2021

Abstract

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank‐firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands‐off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Eleonora Sfrappini Lena Tonzer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 4, 2021

Abstract

The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks without burdening tax payers. We exploit the staggered implementation of the BRRD across 15 European Union (EU) member states to identify banks’ capital cost and capital structure responses. In a first stage, we show that average capital costs of banks increased. WACC hikes are lowest in the core countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) compared to formerly stressed EMU and non-EMU countries. This pattern is driven by changes in the relative WACC weight of equity in response to the BRRD, which indicates enhanced financial system resilience. In a second stage, we document asymmetric transmission patterns of banks’ capital cost changes on to corporates’ borrowing terms. Only EMU banks located in core countries that exhibit higher WACC are those that also increase firms’ borrowing cost and contract credit supply. Hence, the BRRD had unintended consequences for selected segments of the real economy.

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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Moritz Stieglitz

in: IWH Discussion Papers, im Erscheinen

Abstract

Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.

Publikation lesen
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Politics, Banks, and Sub-sovereign Debt: Unholy Trinity or Divine Coincidence?

Michael Koetter Alexander Popov

in: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, Nr. 53, 2018

Abstract

We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians, increase significantly their holdings of home-State sovereign bonds when the local government and the State government are dominated by different political parties. Banks' holdings of other securities, like federal bonds, bonds issued by other States, or stocks, are not affected by election outcomes. We argue that banks use sub-sovereign bond purchases to gain access to politically distant government authorities.

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Schlagworte

Finanzinstitutionen Finanzmärkte Finanzstabilität Evaluierung von Politikmaßnahmen Geldpolitik Neues Europa Risiko Regulierung Immobilien Mittelstand Corona
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